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61 
COUNTERING THE MAJORITARIAN 
DIFFICULTY 
OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION: SECURING 
THE LIBERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF WE THE 
PEOPLE. By Randy E. Barnett.1 New York: HarperCollins 
Publishers. 2016. Pp. xiv + 283. $26.99 (cloth). 
Amy Coney Barrett2 
In Our Republican Constitution,3 Randy Barnett argues that 
the United States Constitution rests on a foundation of individual 
rather than collective popular sovereignty. Grounding the 
legitimacy of the government in the authority given it by each 
individual rather than by the People as a whole echoes the thesis, 
advanced in Barnett’s prior work, that the government must 
justify incursions upon individual liberty.4 If the People as a body 
are sovereign and the Constitution is designed to facilitate 
democratic self-governance, legislation is presumptively 
legitimate because it represents the sovereign will of the 
democratic majority. If the individual is sovereign, by contrast, 
legislation does not represent the sovereign will but rather the 
work product of government officials who serve as the agents of 
 
 1. Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Legal Theory; Director, Georgetown Center 
for the Constitution. 
 2. Diane & M.O. Miller, II Research Chair in Law, Notre Dame Law School. This 
essay was prepared for a roundtable on OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION hosted by the 
University of Illinois and the Georgetown Center for the Constitution. It benefited from 
the comments of the other participants, Jack Balkin, Randy Barnett, Jud Campbell, Kurt 
Lash, Sanford Levinson, Jason Mazzone, and Larry Solum, as well as of my colleagues Bill 
Kelley and John Nagle, who generously read an earlier draft. 
 3. RANDY BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION: SECURING THE LIBERTY 
AND SOVEREIGNTY OF WE THE PEOPLE (2016) [hereinafter BARNETT]. 
 4. See, e.g., RANDY BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE 
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004) (arguing, inter alia, that courts should replace a 
“presumption of constitutionality” with a “presumption of liberty”). RESTORING THE 
LOST CONSTITUTION has been described as “the best defense ever written of a libertarian 
or conservative/libertarian approach to constitutional law.” Steven G. Calabresi, The 
Originalist and Normative Case Against Judicial Activism: A Reply to Professor Randy 
Barnett, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1081, 1081 (2005). 
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individual sovereigns. The citizen is thus positioned to demand 
that his agents explain why legislation lies within the authority he 
has constructively given them to secure his natural rights. 
Courts play an important role under Barnett’s Republican 
Constitution. They provide the forum in which citizens seek 
protection of their natural rights from legislative infringement. 
Like legislators, judges serve as agents of each individual 
sovereign, and judicial deference to democratic majorities is 
“misguided and inconsistent with the most basic premises of the 
Constitution” (p. 18). Rather than treating legislation as 
presumptively constitutional, they must treat the citizen’s 
challenge as presumptively correct. And on the merits, they must 
critically rather than deferentially assess the question whether the 
legislature has exceeded its authority, which is limited to 
regulation securing the “equal protection of the rights of each and 
every person” (p. 25). Barnett thus calls for, among other things, 
a return to the pre-New Deal approach to the Due Process Clause. 
Constitutional scholars have long viewed judicial review 
through the lens of the countermajoritarian difficulty. Under the 
Republican Constitution, however, it is legislatures rather than 
courts that we should worry about.  In this essay, I begin by 
developing the connection between Barnett’s theory of the 
Constitution and his approach to judicial review. I then express 
doubt about the historical support for Barnett’s approach, 
contend that the task he would give courts fails to account for the 
realities of the legislative process, and argue that he overestimates 
the institutional capacity of courts. I conclude by praising 
Barnett’s attention to the often-misunderstood concept of judicial 
restraint. That is a point on which many can agree with Barnett, 
regardless whether they accept his republican take on our 
Constitution. 
I. THE MAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY 
Generations of constitutional scholars have grappled with 
the so-called countermajoritarian difficulty.5 The power of 
judicial review enables courts to interfere with the majority’s 
preferences. Because the baseline in our republic is set in favor of 
democracy, the argument runs, courts should generally defer to 
 
 5. See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962). 
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what the majority wants. Courts apply heightened scrutiny to 
statutes implicating fundamental rights or suspect classes, but 
outside of that context, they are reluctant to interfere with the 
outcome of the democratic process. They give federal and state 
legislatures wide berth in enacting social and economic legislation 
and apply only minimal scrutiny when evaluating federal statutes 
for consistency with the limits on federal power. 
In attacking this state of affairs, Barnett starts with its 
premise: that we should be concerned about the 
countermajoritarian nature of judicial review. Instead, Barnett 
claims, we should be concerned about the majoritarian nature of 
legislation. Democratic majorities pose a consistent threat to 
minority rights. 
Barnett points out that many of the Founders had 
reservations about democracy. Madison’s essay on “The Vices of 
the Political System of the United States,” which matured into 
Federalist No. 10, details the concerns. Every society contains 
factions that will pursue their own self-interest.6 When a faction 
includes a majority of citizens, what is to stop it from unjustly 
infringing upon the rights of those in the minority? Majorities will 
give into the temptation to self-deal by, among other things, 
enriching themselves at the expense of the minority.7 
A republican form of government was the Founders’ solution 
to the excesses of democracy. On a view of our Republic that 
Barnett dubs “the Democratic Constitution,” the Founders 
countered the risk of democratic excess by opting for indirect 
rather than direct democracy (pp. 18-19). Direct democracy 
carries a greater risk of runaway majorities and is in any event 
impracticable in a country the size of the United States, even as it 
existed at the time of the Founding. Thus the Democratic 
Constitution filters its commitment to majority rule through the 
senators and representatives whom the majority votes into office. 
Structural features like federalism, bicameralism, equal state 
representation in the Senate, and differing terms lengths in the 
House and Senate were among the mechanisms the Founders 
 
 6. See p. 56 (A faction is “a number of citizens . . . who are united and actuated by 
some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or 
to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.”) (quoting THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 10, at 78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). 
 7. See p. 54 (observing that “[i]n a democracy, the debtors outnumber the creditors 
and the poor outnumber the rich”). 
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employed to mute the influence of faction. But the Democratic 
Constitution does not eschew the importance of majority rule; it 
aims simply to temper the risk that the majority will get carried 
away. The majority vote of those senators and representatives 
represents, albeit indirectly, the majority will of the People. 
Hence government regulation is legitimate as the product of 
majority rule. 
Barnett rejects this view of the Constitution in favor of what 
he calls “the Republican Constitution.” On Barnett’s account, the 
Founders did not design our Republic to enable elected 
representatives to “re-present” the will of the majority.8 For one 
thing, such an approach would be inadequate to counter the risk 
of factions and democratic excess. For another, the Founders’ 
mistrust of democracy indicates that preserving majority rule was 
not in fact their primary concern. Drawing on, among other 
things, the Declaration of Independence and the Virginia 
declaration that inspired it, Barnett claims that the Founders’ 
purpose in forming the United States was the preservation of the 
pre-existing natural rights of the People—each and every one.9 
These natural, inalienable rights include the rights to life, liberty, 
and property.10 
In the design of the Republican, as opposed to the 
Democratic, Constitution, elected representatives serve to secure 
the natural rights of the individual sovereigns who comprise “We 
the People,” not to carry out the mandate of the majority that 
voted them into office. The legitimacy of government rests on the 
consent of the governed, and the Republican Constitution 
conceives of that consent as flowing from individuals rather than 
the people as a group. Given that the consent of these individuals 
is only constructive, it ought to extend no farther than that to 
which a rational person would consent. A rational person would 
give up his liberty interests only if doing so advanced the larger 
 
 8. See p. 27 (maintaining that under the republican approach, our representative 
government serves as “a popular ‘check’ on the servants of the people” rather than as “a 
practical way to ‘re-present’ the will of the sovereign people”); p. 23 (under a Republican 
Constitution, the “purpose [of government] is not to reflect the people’s will or desire—
which in practice means the will or desires of the majority—but to secure the preexisting 
rights of the We the People, each and every one of us”). 
 9. See pp. 33–41 (describing the origins of the Declaration and how it captured 
thinking about natural rights at the time of the Founding). 
 10. See pp. 38–39; see also p. 69 (asserting that “the right to acquire, possess, and use 
property is a vital means to the pursuit of happiness”). 
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goal of securing his life, liberty, and happiness.11 That line defines 
the scope of authority conferred by the People (the principals) to 
government officials (their agents). 
Thus the republican vision of the Constitution counsels 
courts and constitutional scholars to worry less about preserving 
the product of the democratic process than about the way the 
democratic process is apt to trample the rights of individuals. 
Because the point of government is to secure the pre-existing 
natural rights of the People, legislation is not presumptively 
legitimate simply because it has majority sanction. On the 
contrary, regardless of that majority sanction, it is presumptively 
illegitimate to the extent that it infringes upon the natural rights 
of individual sovereigns. Courts should not give statutes a 
presumption of constitutionality when they review them; instead, 
the state should bear the burden of justifying legislation as lying 
within its limited authority to secure the life, liberty, and property 
of the People. Nor should courts be unduly deferential when 
reviewing the state’s proffered justification. They should return in 
Due Process and Equal Protection challenges to the more 
demanding form of “rational basis” review practiced by courts in 
the Lochner era. And because structural constraints are often 
more effective than substantive limits in preserving individual 
liberty, courts should put teeth in the doctrines that enforce limits 
on federal legislative power.12 As Barnett explains, “when the 
liberty of a fellow citizen and joint sovereign is restricted, judges 
as agents of these citizens have a judicial duty to critically assess 
whether the legislature has improperly exceeded its just powers to 
infringe upon the sovereignty of We the People” (p. 25). 
II. THE HISTORICAL CASE FOR JUDICIAL 
ENFORCEMENT OF THE REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION 
Given Barnett’s stature as an originalist, one might come to 
Our Republican Constitution expecting an originalist argument, 
and the book’s first chapter, which is devoted to founding-era 
history, gives it that flavor. Yet Barnett does not contend that the 
 
 11. Thus, for example, “any rational person” would consent to “the equal protection 
of their [sic] fundamental rights, including their [sic] health and safety” (p. 43); see also 
p. 75 (attributing this view of consent to John Locke). 
 12. See pp. 169–84 (describing the Constitution’s structural and substantive 
constraints upon legislative power and arguing that the former are more effective in 
preserving individual liberty). 
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Constitution’s text demands acceptance of either the republican 
vision or the more searching form of judicial review for which he 
advocates. The book is less about what the Constitution’s original 
public meaning requires than about what is normatively 
attractive. Barnett claims it is desirable to understand the 
Constitution as a document designed to secure the natural rights 
of individual sovereigns, and that one accepting that view should 
find it similarly desirable for courts to play an active role in 
ensuring that the government not exceed the bounds of its 
authority. History, particularly founding-era history, is an 
important data point in his normative case: one reason we should 
find the republican vision attractive is that the founding 
generation did. 
It is worth observing, however, that the history Barnett 
recounts is not entirely one-sided. He assembles evidence from 
the Declaration of Independence, early state Constitutions, and 
the Federalist Papers to support his argument that those who 
drafted and ratified the Constitution were committed to an 
individual rather than collective view of popular sovereignty. 
Vetting that claim would require independent study of the 
historical record, but even taken on its own terms, the evidence 
does not reflect unwavering insistence upon what Barnett 
describes as the republican conception. Instead, his account 
suggests that conflict between the republican and democratic 
views surfaced almost immediately. For instance, he indicates that 
the division is evident in the conflict between the Hamiltonian 
Federalists who favored broad national power and the 
Jeffersonian Republicans who stood for more limited federal 
government.13 Barnett points to the opinions of Justices Jay and 
Wilson in Chisholm v. Georgia as support for an individual 
conception of popular sovereignty, but, as he acknowledges, 
Justice Iredell’s opinion clearly adopts the collective view.14 The 
same divide exists between the opinions of Justices Chase and 
 
 13. See p. 86 (asserting that “in its early days, the Republican opposition to the 
Federalists was in defense of the constitutional limitations of national power that 
characterizes what I am calling our Republican Constitution”). 
 14. See pp. 72–73 (describing the opinions in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793)). 
Barnett disputes the claim that the ratification of the Eleventh Amendment represented 
an embrace of Justice Iredell’s view. See p. 80 (arguing that the Eleventh Amendment 
“said nothing to repudiate the underlying principle of individual popular sovereignty 
articulated by Jay and Wilson . . . [i]t merely changed the text of Article III to deny federal 
courts the jurisdiction to hear such cases”). 
4 - BARRETT_DRAFT 1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/3/17 8:58 AM 
2017] THE MAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY 67 
 
Iredell in Calder v. Bull.15 If conflict existed that early, it is difficult 
to characterize Barnett’s republican view as one uniformly held in 
the founding era. 
Competition, moreover, apparently persisted between these 
two views throughout American history. According to Barnett, 
the issue of individual versus collective popular sovereignty 
divided the pro-slavery Democratic Party (that emerged during 
Andrew Jackson’s presidency) from the abolitionist Republican 
Party (that emerged gradually in the years leading up to 1860).16 
Barnett describes the Reconstruction amendments as a triumph 
of the republican over the democratic view.17 That triumph was 
short-lived, however, for the South used the democratic view as a 
justification for a white majority to impose the odious Jim Crow 
regime on an African American minority.18 New Deal 
progressives succeeded in rendering the democratic view the 
dominant one, and modern conservatives as well as modern 
liberals are the heirs of the New Dealers insofar as they both 
profess commitment to the importance of majority rule and 
concern about the ability of judicial review to interfere with it.19 
Barnett puts his finger on some of theoretical commitments 
that divide modern Americans. I do not here explore Barnett’s 
choice of the labels “Democratic” and “Republican” or the way 
he describes the political history; other contributions to this 
symposium take up those questions. 20 Here, I simply observe that 
 
 15. See p. 73 (contrasting Justice Chase’s commitment to the sovereignty of each 
individual with Justice Iredell’s commitment to the sovereignty of the democratic majority 
in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798)). 
 16. See p. 87 (asserting that the Democratic Party of Andrew Jackson and Martin 
Van Buren “often called itself ‘the Democracy’ because it presumed to speak for the 
people as a whole”); pp. 89-97 (maintaining that the Democratic Party was pro-slavery and 
that its view of popular sovereignty permitted the majority to enslave the minority); pp. 
90–98 (describing the evolution of the Republican party from the antislavery movement 
and characterizing it as grounded in a commitment to the sovereignty of each individual). 
 17. See pp. 106–11 (describing how the Reconstruction amendments led to a more 
Republican Constitution). 
 18. See id. at 120–24 (describing the decline of the republican view in the post-
Reconstruction era). 
 19. See pp. 124–63 (describing the rise and influence of progressivism). 
 20. See Jack Balkin, Which Republican Constitution? 32 CONST. COMMENT. 31 
(2016) (arguing that Barnett’s version of “republicanism” is closer to “natural rights 
liberalism” than to the “historical tradition of republicanism”); id. at 42 (arguing that 
Barnett’s imagined opposition “between the Republican and Democratic Constitutions is 
really a schematic or idealized version of the struggle between classical liberalism and 
progressivism at the beginning of the twentieth century”); id. at 43 (claiming that Barnett 
unfairly “lumps modern liberals together with progressives”); see also Sanford Levinson, 
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even taken on Barnett’s own terms, competition between the 
republican and democratic views of sovereignty seems to be as old 
as the Constitution itself. 
History is more complicated when it comes to Barnett’s 
argument about the role of the courts in protecting the natural 
rights of individual sovereigns against unauthorized government 
interference. As with the republican vision itself, Barnett does not 
claim that the Constitution’s original public meaning requires 
courts to review statutes as he suggests. On the contrary, he 
acknowledges that the constitutional text is silent on this point 
and maintains that the approach one takes “will depend on 
whether one holds a republican or democratic vision of the 
Constitution” (p. 111). Yet if founding-era commitment to the 
republican vision was as unwavering as Barnett maintains, and if 
the republican vision logically leads to greater reliance upon 
judicial review, one would expect to see many founding-era cases 
in which litigants came to the courts to enforce their rights to 
liberty and property against self-seeking democratic majorities. 
But Barnett does not identify federal or state cases in which 
litigants claimed—under either the federal or state 
constitutions—that statutes were invalid because they infringed 
upon the natural rights of the People.21 To be sure, the lack of 
general federal question jurisdiction meant that federal courts, at 
least, would have had a limited opportunity to consider such 
claims, but that limited jurisdiction itself reflects an early view 
about the limited role of the federal courts.22 Whatever support 
history gives to the case for a Republican Constitution, it appears 
 
Randy Barnett’s Disdain for Democracy (and John Marshall), 32 CONST. COMMENT. 113, 
114–16 (2016) (critiquing Barnett’s use of the term “republican”). 
 21. Litigants could have raised such a challenge to federal legislation after the Fifth 
Amendment was ratified in 1791. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing that no person 
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law). A claim that rent-
seeking state legislation violated the United States Constitution could not have been made 
until after the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. Nonetheless, one would expect to see 
such challenges made to state laws under state constitutions, particularly if those state 
constitutions were indeed committed to the republican vision. See p. 67 (contending that 
many state constitutions were so committed). Barnett does point out that Corfield v. 
Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546 (C.C. Ed. Pa. 1823) invoked the concept of natural rights, but that 
case involved a claim by a nonresident that New Jersey was discriminating in violation of 
Article IV’s Privilege and Immunities Clause rather than a claim that a statute is invalid if 
it is not truly designed to secure the natural rights of the People. 
 22. Congress did not enact a lasting grant of general federal question jurisdiction 
until 1875. 
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to cut the other way with respect to the role of the courts in 
enforcing it. 
III. THE RATIONAL BASIS TEST AND THE 
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 
The modern rational basis test instructs courts to uphold a 
statute if it can posit a permissible reason why the legislature 
might have enacted it. Barnett criticizes this test, insisting that 
courts must identify a statute’s actual purpose to evaluate its 
constitutionality. As he puts it, courts “should ferret out when [the 
legislature’s] ‘just powers’ are being invoked as a mere pretext to 
exercising powers that have not been—and cannot justly be—
entrusted to a republican government, where the people are the 
ultimate sovereigns” (p. 112). Courts need to “realistically assess 
whether restrictions on liberty were truly calculated to protect the 
health and safety of the general public, rather than being the 
product of ‘other motives’ beyond the just powers of a republican 
legislature.”23 This is necessary because “[r]equiring the 
government to identify its true purpose and then show that the 
means chosen are actually well suited to advance that purpose 
helps to smoke out illicit motives that the government is never 
presumed by a sovereign people to have authorized” (p. 232). 
Barnett portrays the statutes at issue in many of the classic 
Fourteenth Amendment cases—including Lochner, Carolene 
Products, and Lee Optical—as illustrative of regulations actually 
designed to protect the economic interests of a powerful faction 
at the expense of a weaker minority rather than to advance any 
public interest in health or safety.24 The anemic rational basis test 
permits such statutes to be characterized as reasonably calculated 
to serve a legitimate end, but Barnett maintains that anyone who 
believes that has been hoodwinked. The maximum-hours statute 
challenged in Lochner protected commercial bakeries from 
 
 23. See p. 125 (emphasis added) (praising the late-18th and early 19th century courts 
who took this approach). 
 24. Barnett also characterizes the statute at issue in the Slaughter-House Cases, which 
required all butchers to use a particular facility, as one giving a private monopoly to the 
company that owned this facility. See pp. 115–16. Muller v. Oregon addressed a statute 
protecting white male union members from competition with women, and Nebbia v. New 
York involved a statute that helped large milk distributors avoid competition from small 
retailers operating in poor neighborhoods. See p. 223. 
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competition by smaller, ethnic bakeries;25 the ban on filled milk 
challenged in Carolene Products insulated the makers of other 
dairy products from competition;26 and the prescription 
requirement challenged in Lee Optical protected optometrists 
from competition by opticians who could sell cheaper glasses (pp. 
222-223). 
Barnett’s emphasis on the importance of recovering the 
legislature’s true purpose understates the complexity of 
identifying legislative intent. It is extraordinarily difficult—if 
possible at all—for a court to glean what was “really” going on 
behind the scenes of a statute.27 A legislature is a multimember 
body, and different members may have different motives. Perhaps 
some legislators enacting a ban on filled milk were concerned 
about its health effects and others were beholden to a powerful 
dairy lobby. Whose intent controls? Is such a statute truly 
calculated to promote health and safety or is it the kind of rent-
seeking statute that rational individual sovereigns would not 
countenance? Do the rent-seeking motives of some legislators 
corrupt the statute if other legislators act with the public welfare 
in view? Where, moreover, would a court look to discover the 
legislature’s true motive? Legislative history is unlikely to contain 
an express acknowledgement of illicit motive, and even if it did, 
floor statements and committee reports do not reliably reflect the 
views of the majority who supported the statute. Current doctrine 
accepts a possible, rational purpose—i.e., one that can be inferred 
from the statutory text—rather than engaging in a hunt for the 
actual, subjective purpose precisely because the latter is illusory.28 
 
 25. See p. 138 (noting that the provision capping the hours of bakery employees at 60 
per week benefited commercial bakeries that could schedule their workers in shifts at the 
expense of smaller, ethnic bakeries with fewer employees). 
 26. See p. 156 (asserting that filled milk was healthier than fresh cow’s milk, which 
carried dangerous bacteria, and the “politically powerful dairy farm lobby” pushed 
Congress to ban it from the market). 
 27. Cf. Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Delaware, 450 U.S. 662, 702-03 
(1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (criticizing Justice Brennan’s argument that the Court 
should consider only the legislature’s actual purpose, rather than a possible purpose, in 
adjudicating a Dormant Commerce Clause challenge because, inter alia, “it assumes that 
individual legislators are motivated by one discernible ‘actual’ purpose . . .”). 
 28. See John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2450 
(2003) (arguing that a court that looks for “‘actual’ legislative purpose risks attributing 
unwarranted coherence to the legislative process, which may entail logrolling or other 
strategic voting, making concessions to strongly felt but outlying interests, or papering over 
disagreements to ensure the legislation’s passage” and that respect for this “inherently 
unruly legislative process” requires judges to “focus only on the rationality of the 
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In addition to forcing identification of the government’s true 
purpose, Barnett calls for greater scrutiny of the fit between 
statutory ends and means. On the one hand, he offers a 
compelling case that modern courts have occasionally stretched 
even the existing rationality test too far. For example, it is indeed 
difficult to see the connection between safe casket-making and a 
funeral home director’s license.29 A rational basis test ought not 
mean that courts are obliged to accept explanations that beggar 
all belief. 
On the other hand, the strength of the “rational basis” test 
can vary according to the perspective of the beholder, and Barnett 
favors one with more bite. In calibrating the strength of the test, 
it is important to keep in mind—especially with respect to the kind 
of complex legislation that emerges at the federal level—that 
courts cannot seek too much perfection from the often-chaotic 
legislative process.30 Modern textualists in particular have 
emphasized the ways in which the battle between competing 
interests shapes legislation. In the federal system, the process of 
bicameralism and presentment forces compromise between the 
House and the Senate, as well as between both houses and the 
President. But even within each house, “[b]ills are shaped by a 
process that entails committee approval, the scheduling of a floor 
vote, logrolling, the threat of filibuster, the potential for 
presidential veto, and an assortment of other procedural 
obstacles.”31 Passing these veto gates requires proponents to 
compromise with opponents, and compromise can produce 
awkward language.32 For example, it may be necessary to narrow 
 
legislative outcomes themselves, not on whether those outcomes further some actual or 
likely legislative purpose.”); see also Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636–37 (1987) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“For while it is possible to discern the objective ‘purpose’ of a 
statute (i.e., the public good at which its provisions appear to be directed) . . . discerning 
the subjective motivation of those enacting the statute is, to be honest, almost always an 
impossible task.”). 
 29. See p. 233 (relating “story of the Benedictine monks of St. Joseph Abbey in 
Louisiana who were barred by the Louisiana State Board of Embalmers & Funeral 
Directors from selling caskets without a funeral home director’s license”). 
 30. See Manning, supra note 28, at 2446 (“[T]he rational basis test . . . . starts from 
the premise that a properly functioning legislative process often produces imperfect 
legislation, rough accommodations, and uneven compromises.”). 
 31. Id. at 2417. 
 32. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., Inc., 511 U.S. 244, 286 (1994) (“Statutes are 
seldom crafted to pursue a single goal, and compromises necessary to their enactment may 
require adopting means other than those that would most effectively pursue the main 
goal.”); Preseault v. I.C.C., 494 U.S. 1, 19 (1990) (“The process of legislating often involves 
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or broaden language in order to bring others on board.33 As 
Justice Thomas wrote for the Court in refusing to apply the 
absurdity doctrine to awkwardly drawn provisions in a pension 
statute: 
[N]egotiations surrounding enactment of this bill tell a typical 
story of legislative battle among interest groups, Congress, and 
the President. Indeed, this legislation failed to ease tensions 
among many of the interested parties. Its delicate crafting 
reflected a compromise amidst highly interested parties 
attempting to pull the provisions in different directions. As 
such, a change in any individual provision could have 
unraveled the whole.34 
Reaching agreement about how to handle a particular social 
or economic problem requires give and take from parties who 
have not only conflicting self-interests but also conflicting ideas 
about what best serves the public interest. 
No statute, moreover, pursues its purpose at all costs. A 
legislature must draw the line somewhere, and deferential 
rational-basis review acknowledges that line-drawing is often 
awkward.35 Take, for example, the statute at issue in Lochner. 
Barnett insists that it was irrational for the New York legislature 
to cap the hours of bakery employees but not bakery owners (p. 
130). Even assuming that it would have better served the 
legislative purpose to cap the hours of the owners too, must the 
legislature do everything at once?36 Perhaps the legislature drew 
the line at bakery employees because it thought they were, all 
things considered, likely to benefit more than owners from fewer 
hours. Or perhaps owners would have vehemently opposed limits 
on their hours, and the bill might have failed if they were included. 
 
tradeoffs, compromises, and imperfect solutions, and our ability to imagine ways of 
redesigning the state to advance one of Congress’ ends does noes not render it irrational.”). 
 33. See Manning, supra note 28, at 2417 (pointing out that imperfect statutory 
language “may well reflect an unrecorded compromise or the need to craft language 
broadly or narrowly to clear the varied veto gates encountered along the way to 
enactment”). 
 34. Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 461 (2002). 
 35. Cf. U.S. R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980) (observing that 
line-drawing “‘inevitably requires that some persons who have an almost equally strong 
claim to favored treatment be placed on different sides of the line,’ and the fact [that] the 
line might have been drawn differently at some points is a matter for legislative, rather 
than judicial, consideration”) (quoting Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 83-84 (1976)). 
 36. Cf. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“Men 
whom I certainly could not pronounce unreasonable would uphold [the hours cap] as a 
first instalment [sic] of a general regulation of the hours of work.”). 
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A statute is not necessarily irrational or contrary to the public 
interest because it would have been reasonable to do more. 
In sum, the Court’s current approach, which accepts 
hypothetical purposes and demands only minimal rationality, 
accounts for the normal functioning of the legislative process. The 
legislature is not an idealized body that acts with one mind, but a 
multimember body that produces legislation through a complex 
and even chaotic process. Any bill that runs the gamut of this 
process represents compromises made along the way, sometimes 
to resolve the competing desires of different constituencies and 
sometimes because the legislature has drawn a line somewhere. 
IV. THE INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY OF THE COURTS 
Barnett proposes to alter the current regime of highly 
deferential judicial review of social and economic legislation in 
two respects. He would both put more bite into rationality review 
and reverse the presumption of constitutionality. Under current 
doctrine, courts assume that statutes are constitutional unless the 
challenger shows otherwise. When applied to federal legislation, 
this presumption reflects respect for a coordinate branch, and 
when applied to a state statute, it reflects respect for the states. 
Barnett implicitly rejects departmentalism, inter-branch comity, 
and federalism as good reasons for the presumption; he argues 
that the presumption is always inappropriate because it favors the 
servant over the principal.37 A constitutional challenge to a statute 
is a mechanism by which an individual sovereign calls the 
legislature to account. The presumption, he says, should thus run 
the other way—the individual sovereign is entitled to an 
explanation for why the legislature has acted within the scope of 
its limited authority to secure the People’s natural rights. 
Reallocating the burden, particularly when combined with more 
searching substantive review, better preserves the sovereignty of 
the People. 
 
 37. See p. 229 (asserting that a judge who “simply ‘presumes’ that the legislature is 
acting properly, or ‘defers’ to the legislature’s own assessment of its powers, then that judge 
is not acting impartially”). In any suit, someone has to bear the burden of proof. Here, 
either the challenger must bear the burden of showing that the statute is unconstitutional 
or the government must bear the burden of showing that it is. Despite Barnett’s wording, 
his attack on the presumption of constitutionality seems better understood as a claim about 
where the burden should be placed than as a claim that placing a burden reflects judicial 
bias. 
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Barnett’s call for greater judicial willingness to invalidate 
statutes reflects confidence in the ability of the courts to protect 
individual liberty, particularly relative to the legislatures he 
describes as so easily corrupted by faction. Yet while he offers a 
fulsome explanation of why we should mistrust legislatures, he 
spends less time defending the institutional capacity of the courts. 
Highly deferential judicial review reflects the judgment that 
a more searching inquiry would pull judges into terrain they are 
not good at navigating. Rational-basis review under the Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses is a case in point. The 
current, deferential regime reflects humility about the capacity of 
judges to evaluate the soundness of scientific and economic 
claims; Barnett’s approach, by contrast, reflects confidence that 
they are up to the job. Is that confidence warranted? Are judges 
well suited to assess competing claims about the nutritional value 
of filled milk or a complex environmental policy?38 To be sure, 
Barnett acknowledges that judges are not perfect; he observes 
that “[a]cross-the-board skepticism about the rationality of a 
restriction on liberty does not guarantee that prejudice bolstered 
by junk science will lose” (p. 148). He does not address the 
opposing concern, however, that judges will reject scientific or 
economic claims that they ought to accept. 
Moreover, nearly every government regulation comes at 
some price to individual liberty. Determining whether a 
government regulation truly serves the public interest, therefore, 
requires determining whether the price is worth paying. Would 
courts be good at identifying and re-weighing relative costs and 
benefits of decisions like a ban on the use of medicinal 
marijuana?39 They attempt to identify and reweigh the costs and 
benefits of state regulation in the context of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, and there is longstanding controversy about 
whether they are equipped to do it well.40 
 
 38. See p. 234 (criticizing the Carolene Products Court for relying on “junk science” 
to sustain a ban on the sale of “filled milk”). Barnett says that it was easy for the lower 
court in Lee Optical to conclude that operating a lensometer does not require the expertise 
of a specialist (like an optometrist) but can be operated by any “reasonably intelligent 
person” (like an optician) (p. 238). Regardless whether that conclusion would be easy to 
reach, many statutes would present far more complex questions. 
 39. See p. 188 (suggesting that prohibiting medicinal marijuana would violate either 
the Due Process Clause or the Ninth Amendment). 
 40. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564 
(1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (insisting that “any test that requires us to assess,” inter 
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Apart from institutional capacity, Barnett does not talk 
about the features of Article III that have traditionally provoked 
worry about over-zealous exercises of the power of judicial 
review. Consider life tenure. On the one hand, life tenure may 
make judges brave enough to stand up to the majority. On the 
other hand, life tenure means that judges are unaccountable for 
bad decisions so long as they are not insane or corrupt. If judges 
get it wrong, the People have no way to remove them from office. 
While one can doubt whether the People can effectively discipline 
legislators at the ballot box for any given policy choice,41 
legislators must still ultimately face the People to keep their jobs. 
Article III judges—particularly Supreme Court justices, whose 
decisions are not subject to reversal by a higher authority—
answer to no one. The feeling of infallibility that accompanies 
finality is a force to be guarded against.42 Properly understood, a 
commitment to judicial restraint is a commitment to resist the 
temptation to exceed the bounds of the judicial power. 
My choice of the word “power” is deliberate. Barnett 
contrasts the “power” of Congress with the “duty” of judicial 
review. He says that Article I’s choice of the word “power” to 
describe the scope of Congress’s authority invokes “long-standing 
principles of agency law;” the government exercises its power “on 
behalf of and subject to the control of the principal,” the sovereign 
People who granted it power (p. 63, emphasis omitted). Power, he 
explains, goes hand in hand with limits. When he is talking about 
judicial review, by contrast, he stresses that it is not a “power” but 
a “duty” of the courts. In characterizing it as a duty, he stresses 
that Federalist No. 78 called it a “duty,” as did Marbury v. 
Madison in insisting that “[i]t is emphatically the province and 
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” (p. 60, 
 
alia, “whether a particular statute serves a ‘legitimate’ local public interest” and “whether 
there are alternative means of furthering the local interest that have a ‘lesser impact’ on 
interstate commerce, and even then makes the question ‘one of degree,’ surely invites us, 
if not compels us, to function more as legislators than as judges.”); Southern Pacific Co. v. 
Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) (Black, J., dissenting) (“Whether it is in the interest of society 
for the length of trains to be governmentally regulated is a matter of public policy. . . . this 
Court [should] leave that choice to the elected legislative representatives of the people 
themselves, where it properly belongs both on democratic principles and the requirements 
of efficient government.”). 
 41. See pp. 176–77 (arguing that it is a fiction to believe that voters can discipline the 
policy choices of legislators through elections). 
 42. Cf. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“We are 
not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.”). 
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emphasis omitted). The choice of the word “duty” rather than 
“power” is significant, Barnett argues, because “[p]owers can and 
should be exercised with discretion or ‘restraint,’ but we don’t 
speak the same way of our duties . . . [r]ather, we think these 
duties should be completely and fully honored. In contrast, the 
exercise of our powers can be characterized as a matter of 
discretion and moderation” (p. 126). 
The Constitution, however, nowhere refers to a “duty of 
judicial review.” The ability to engage in judicial review exists by 
virtue of the “judicial Power” conferred by Article III, because 
that is the provision that enables federal courts to act. For 
constitutional purposes, then, judicial review is an exercise of 
power. If the distinction between “duty” and “power” matters in 
the way Barnett says—i.e., that the concepts of restraint and limits 
are inapplicable to the exercise of “duty”—then judicial review 
falls in the “power” category. Just as Congress must be cognizant 
of the limits upon its legislative power, the courts must be 
cognizant of the limits upon their judicial power. 
Barnett is much less concerned about courts exceeding the 
limits of the judicial power than about their not doing enough. 
When he addresses the potential harms of judicial review, he 
focuses on the harm the Court inflicts when it fails to invalidate a 
statute that it should. To make the point, he invokes examples 
about which there is agreement that the Court should have 
intervened, such as Plessy v. Ferguson,43 as well as those about 
which there is not, such as United States v. Carolene Products.44 
Barnett does not discuss, however, the harm the Court can do 
when the mistake runs the other way: when it invalidates 
legislation that it should let stand. Focusing on the danger of the 
Court’s doing too little rather than too much is consistent with 
Barnett’s generally libertarian approach, which is reflected in the 
presumption of unconstitutionality he would give statutes—
regulation is presumed to be unauthorized unless the government 
can show otherwise.45 If government should regulate less, it is 
better for the Court to err on the side of striking down too much 
regulation than on the side of letting too much stand. 
 
 43. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 44. 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
 45. In other work, Barnett has argued that courts should replace the presumption of 
constitutionality with a presumption of liberty. See supra note 4. He does not make that 
argument express in OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION. 
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Even under the republican vision that Barnett elaborates, 
however, wrongful invalidation of regulation should be 
concerning. He argues that the purpose of government is to secure 
our pre-existing rights and that the government does that through 
regulations that promote health and safety. If courts stand in the 
way of legitimate health and safety regulation, they cripple the 
ability of government officials (the agents) to pursue policies 
securing the rights of individual sovereigns (the principals). 
Barnett keeps his focus on the sovereigns who challenge 
legislation in court. But of course other sovereigns favor the 
challenged policy, and it is unfair (not to mention 
unconstitutional) for courts to prevent them from achieving 
permissible aims. 
There are winners and losers in the battle over whether to 
pass any given statute. Barnett is not a big fan of democracy, but 
voting is undeniably part of our system. Even if our Constitution 
is the republican one for which Barnett advocates, when a 
majority of the elected representatives who serve the People 
supports a constitutionally permissible statute, that statute is 
binding even on those who dissent from it. Overall, Barnett too 
quickly dismisses concerns about judicial activism. While he is 
right to insist that courts ought not operate based on a distorted 
understanding of judicial restraint,46 he overcompensates in the 
other direction. There is a risk that a faction can run away with 
the legislative process, but there is also a risk that a faction will 
conscript courts into helping them win battles they have already 
lost, fair and square. 
When litigants challenge the constitutionality of a statute in 
the Supreme Court, the question is whether those who object to 
the statute are entitled to a national rule precluding such 
regulation. Barnett’s insights about federalism, while aimed at 
Congress, are relevant here. Barnett observes that nationalizing 
policy preferences risks increasing political polarization by 
entirely eliminating the possibility of dissent. “[T]he more 
important the issue,” he points out, “the more likely it will 
engender a political war of all against all to avoid having another’s 
social policy imposed on you” (p. 183, emphasis omitted).47 While 
he is talking about Congress, the point is also applicable to the 
 
 46. See infra Part V. 
 47. See also pp. 183–84 (“[T]he more important the issue, the less it is fit to be decided 
at the national level.”). 
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Supreme Court. Because the Court’s holding on a constitutional 
question stands as a national rule that precludes local variation, 
battles in high profile cases are incredibly pitched and their results 
can be politically polarizing.48 The Court’s reluctance to disturb 
statutes that do not involve fundamental rights or suspect 
classifications limits the number of such battles that play out 
before it; insofar as state laws are concerned, the Court’s 
deferential approach errs on the side of permitting local variation. 
More vigorous enforcement of federalism might decrease the risk 
of over-nationalizing policy preferences at the hands of Congress; 
at the same time, more vigorous enforcement of the Due Process 
and Equal Protection Clauses may increase the risk of over-
nationalizing policy preferences at the hands of the Supreme 
Court. Once the Supreme Court weighs in on a constitutional 
question, the entire nation is bound, and the opportunity for 
regional differences is extinguished. 
Deferential judicial review of run-of-the-mill legislation is 
consistent with the reality that the harm inflicted by the Supreme 
Court’s erroneous interference in the democratic process is 
harder to remedy than the harm inflicted by an ill-advised statute. 
The Supreme Court’s constitutional mistakes are extremely 
difficult to correct; one can hope only for a change of heart, a 
change of personnel, or a change by constitutional amendment. 
By contrast, it is feasible, even if difficult, to repeal or amend bad 
statutes, and both Congress and state legislatures do it with 
varying levels of frequency. At the state level, moreover, the harm 
of an ill-advised statute is regionally confined. Even if one state 
legislature makes a mistake, the other forty-nine remain free to 
choose a different course. A Supreme Court constitutional error, 
however, applies nationwide. 
When it comes to confidence in the courts, it is worth noting 
that Barnett’s examples highlight the ability of courts to curb the 
legislatures who enable rent-seeking majorities to unfairly restrict 
the liberty and property rights of minorities. He thus envisions the 
way that property-protective courts can curb the influence of 
progressive legislatures. But what if the tables are turned, and 
 
 48. Cf. William Eskridge, Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can Support 
Democracy by Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L.J. 1279, 1313 (2005) (asserting 
that “Roe essentially declared a winner in one of the most difficult and divisive public law 
debates of American history,” and it “was a threat to our democracy because it raised the 
stakes of an issue where primordial loyalties ran deep”). 
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there are progressive courts and a property-protective 
legislature?49 Would Barnett find it as attractive to have courts 
engaging in more aggressive judicial review? If one worries about 
the political inclinations of judges creeping in—and Barnett’s 
critique of progressive judges indicates that he does—then one 
might be warier about enhancing the risk that judges will confuse 
the demands of the Constitution with their own conception of the 
public interest. 
Barnett characterizes courts as a refuge from the 
majoritarian excesses of the legislature, but they are only a refuge 
if they are untainted by the corrupting influences that Barnett sees 
in the democratic process. The history he recounts leaves one to 
wonder why he has such faith in courts. Would Prigg, Dred Scott, 
and Plessy have come out differently if courts had only applied 
the standard Barnett proposes? Was it really a misguided 
attachment to judicial restraint that drove those cases, or did the 
Court see through the same discriminatory lens as the 
legislature?50 Courts are not always heroes and legislatures are not 
always villains. They are both capable of doing good, and they are 
both capable of doing harm. 
Even if courts were always heroes, however, they could not 
offer us complete protection from legislative overreaching. The 
reality is that Congress and the President are frequently the only 
institutional actors with the opportunity to evaluate the 
constitutionality of legislation. In describing checks and balances, 
Barnett says, “Not only does such legislation have to pass two 
chambers of Congress, but it must be approved by the president 
and evaluated for constitutionality by the judiciary” (p. 211). But 
it doesn’t. Courts only get the opportunity to engage in judicial 
review when litigants with standing file complaints. Limitations 
upon standing—most notably, the general prohibition of 
“taxpayer standing”—mean that there are a great number of laws 
that federal courts never review. Courts do not, and in our 
 
 49. Cf. John Copeland Nagle, Newt Gingrich, Dynamic Statutory Interpreter? 143 U. 
PA. L. REV. 2209 (1995) (pointing out that proponents of dynamic statutory interpretation 
may be less enthused about the project of updating statutes to reflect current political 
preferences when the congressional majority is conservative). 
 50. A court opining that “we cannot say that a law which authorizes or even requires 
the separation of the two races in public conveyances is unreasonable,” Plessy v. Ferguson, 
163 U.S. 537, 550–51 (1896), does not seem the kind of court likely to reach a different 
result even if the standard of review were more exacting. 
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constitutional system cannot, have as great a role in policing the 
political branches as Barnett would like them to. 
V. JUDICIAL RESTRAINT 
Our Republican Constitution is animated in large part by 
Barnett’s frustration with what he regards as a misguided 
attachment to judicial restraint, particularly on the part of 
conservatives.51 In NFIB v. Sebelius, the inspiration for Barnett’s 
book, Chief Justice Roberts pushed the Affordable Care Act 
beyond its plausible meaning to save the statute. He construed the 
penalty imposed on those without health insurance as a tax, which 
permitted him to sustain the statute as a valid exercise of the 
taxing power; had he treated the payment as the statute did—as a 
penalty—he would have had to invalidate the statute as lying 
beyond Congress’s commerce power.52 Barnett vehemently 
objects to the idea that a commitment to judicial restraint—
understood as deference to democratic majorities—can justify a 
judicial refusal to interpret the law as written. 
Barnett is surely right that deference to a democratic 
majority should not supersede a judge’s duty to apply clear text. 
That is true, incidentally, even if one subscribes to the collective 
view of popular sovereignty, for a judge who adopts an 
interpretation inconsistent with the text fails to enforce the statute 
that commanded majority support. If the majority did not enact a 
“tax,” interpreting the statute to impose a tax lacks democratic 
legitimacy. Insofar as Barnett aims his critique of judicial restraint 
 
 51. See p. 17 (asserting that with NFIB v. Sebelius, “[t]he chickens of the conservative 
commitment to judicial restraint had thus come home to roost.”); see also p. 81 (asserting 
that “the tragedy of the Supreme Court’s decision in the Obamacare case was made 
possible by modern-day ‘judicial conservatives’ accepting as valid the progressive attack 
on our Republican Constitution.”); p. 248 (“The visibility of our Obamacare challenge and 
the way a Republican-nominated, conservative chief justice snatched defeat from the jaws 
of victory, may prove to be a political inflection point.”). 
 52. See NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2593–2600 (2012) (characterizing the 
“penalty” imposed by the individual mandate as a “tax”). The other four justices in the 
majority on this issue would not have needed to construe the penalty as a tax to save the 
statute, because they thought that the Commerce Clause authorized Congress to impose 
the mandate. See id. at 2609 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“Unlike 
the Chief Justice, however, I would hold, alternatively, that the Commerce Clause 
authorizes Congress to enact the minimum coverage provision.”). The four dissenting 
justices objected that “[w]e have never held that any exaction imposed for violation of the 
law is an exercise of Congress’ taxing power—even when the statute calls it a tax, much 
less when (as here) the statute repeatedly calls it a penalty.” See id. at 2651 (joint opinion 
of Scalia, J., Kennedy, J., Thomas, J., and Alito, J., dissenting). 
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at the conservatives in his popular audience, it is worth 
considering why they might misunderstand the concept. It may be 
because they consider themselves originalists but misunderstand 
originalism. 
Originalism is associated with judicial restraint in the popular 
consciousness because it emerged in the 1980s as a conservative 
response to the perceived activism of the Warren and Burger 
Courts.53 Originalists insisted that the Court needed to be reined 
in so that the democratic process could function. They 
characterized originalism as a mechanism for stopping the 
minority of Supreme Court justices (and the elites who supported 
them) from imposing their will on the American majority. 
Originalism’s ability to restrain judges was trumpeted as its chief 
virtue. It “was thought to limit the discretion of the judge” and to 
promote “judicial deference to legislative majorities.”54 
Originalists have refined their arguments in the intervening 
years, however, and they have abandoned the claim that one 
should be an originalist because originalism produces more 
restrained judges.55 Originalism has shifted from being a theory 
about how judges should decide cases to a theory about what 
counts as valid, enforceable law.56 The Constitution’s original 
public meaning is important not because adhering to it limits 
judicial discretion, but because it is the law. And because it is the 
law, judges must be faithful to it.57 As Keith Whittington has 
explained, “The new originalism does not require judges to get 
 
 53. See Keith Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL. 599, 601 
(2004) (“[O]riginalism was a reactive theory motivated by substantive disagreement with 
the recent and then-current actions of the Warren and Burger Courts . . . .”). By saying 
that originalism “emerged in the 1980s,” I do not mean that it was entirely new. It is simply 
that before the 1980s, it was “not a terribly self-conscious theory of constitutional 
interpretation, in part because it was largely unchallenged as an important component of 
any viable approach . . . .” Id. at 599. It emerged “in its modern, self-conscious form” after 
it was attacked. Id. 
 54. Id. at 602. 
 55. Id. at 608-09 (explaining that the new originalists have largely abandoned the 
emphasis on judicial restraint). 
 56. See Mitchell N. Berman & Kevin Toh, On What Distinguishes the New 
Originalism from the Old: A Jurisprudential Take, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 559 (2013) 
(asserting that it is accurate to say that the new originalism “is principally a theory about 
‘what counts as law.’”) (quoting Steven D. Smith, Reply to Koppelman: Originalism and 
the (Merely) Human Constitution, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 189, 193 (2010). 
 57. Keith Whittington, Originalism: A Critical Introduction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 
375, 393 (2013) (“There is now a widespread emphasis on the centrality of constitutional 
fidelity to the originalist project, rather than the centrality of judicial restraint.”). 
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out of the way of legislatures. It requires judges to uphold the 
original Constitution—nothing more, but also nothing less.”58 
The measure of a court, then, is its fidelity to the original 
public meaning, which serves as a constraint upon judicial 
decisionmaking.59 A faithful judge resists the temptation to 
conflate the meaning of the Constitution with the judge’s own 
political preference; judges who give into that temptation exceed 
the limits of their power by holding a statute unconstitutional 
when it is not. That was the heart of the originalist critique of the 
Warren and Burger Courts. At the same time, fidelity will 
inevitably require a court to hold some statutes unconstitutional.60 
When a statute conflicts with the Constitution, the fundamental 
law of the Constitution must take precedence, and the ordinary 
law of the statute must give way—because, properly understood, 
it is not law at all. A court does not overstep simply by holding a 
statute unconstitutional; it oversteps if it does so without 
constitutional warrant. Assessing whether the Court has been 
activist requires one to evaluate the merits of its decisions, not to 
tally the number of statutes it has held unconstitutional. 
Given their commitment to textual fidelity, one would be 
hard-pressed to find many originalists who think that a court 
should find a way to uphold a statute when determinate text 
points in the opposite direction. That is certainly true if the 
relevant text is constitutional. The Constitution’s meaning is fixed 
until lawfully changed; thus, the court must stick with the original 
public meaning of the text even if it rules out the preference of a 
current majority. It is also true, however, if the relevant text is a 
statute. Most originalists in constitutional interpretation are 
textualists in statutory interpretation.61 Textualists interpret 
statutes in accord with their original public meaning and maintain 
 
 58. See Whittington, supra note 53, at 609. 
 59. See Thomas Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L. J. 713, 751 
(2011) (distinguishing between “judicial restraint—in the sense of deference to legislative 
majorities” and “judicial constraint—in the sense of promising to narrow the discretion of 
judges” (emphasis omitted)). 
 60. See Whittington, supra note 57, at 393 (asserting that “the tendency of the 
judiciary to uphold or strike down political actions must be purely contingent” because it 
is “[t]he stringency of constitutional requirements and the decisions of political actors 
[that] will determine the extent to which an originalist court will actively strike down 
legislation”). 
 61. See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1, 8 (2001) (noting that “statutory textualists are originalists in matters of 
constitutional law”). 
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that their meaning is fixed until lawfully changed. Because 
textualists refuse to depart from clear statutory text, they would 
consider it wrong to twist statutory text beyond what its meaning 
will bear to avoid collision with a constitutional barrier.62 
NFIB v. Sebelius might be explained by the fact that Chief 
Justice Roberts has not proven himself to be a textualist in matters 
of statutory interpretation. Even in straight-up statutory 
interpretation cases, Chief Justice Roberts has found himself on 
the opposite side of staunch textualists like Justices Scalia, 
Thomas, and Alito precisely because of his willingness to depart 
from ostensibly clear text to better serve the statutory purpose.63 
Indeed, Richard Re has dubbed the Roberts Court’s approach 
“the new Holy Trinity” after the case best known for openly 
prioritizing purpose over text. While the Roberts version does not 
expressly assert the power to depart from statutory text, Re 
 
 62. Thus modern textualists have backed away from the absurdity doctrine, which 
justifies textual departures when the application of a statute’s plain text would produce an 
inequitable result. See Manning, supra note 28, at 2485-86 (arguing that the absurdity 
doctrine is inconsistent with the premises of modern textualism). They have also expressed 
doubt about the legitimacy of those canons that arguably permit courts to depart from a 
text’s ordinary meaning. See Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 
90 B.U. L. REV. 109, 164 (2010) (asserting that substantive canons permitting courts to 
alter the language of a statute conflict with “[t]he bedrock principle of textualism,” which 
“is its insistence that federal courts cannot contradict the plain language of a statute, 
whether in the service of legislative intention or in the exercise of a judicial power to render 
the law more just”). 
 63. Compare King v. Burwell 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2496 (2015) (holding in an opinion 
written by Chief Justice Roberts that the phrase “Established by the State” in the 
Affordable Care Act allows tax credits for insurance purchased on an exchange established 
by the federal government) with id. at 2496 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (insisting in an opinion 
joined by Justices Thomas and Alito that an exchange established by the federal 
government does not qualify as an exchange “Established by the State”); compare Bond 
v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014) (holding in an opinion written by Chief Justice 
Roberts that the defendant’s use of toxic chemicals to injure her husband’s lover did not 
constitute use of a “chemical weapon,” defined by the relevant statute as “any chemical 
that can cause death, temporary incapacitation, or permanent harm to humans or 
animals”) with id. at 2094 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (insisting in an opinion joined by Justices 
Thomas and Alito that “it is clear beyond doubt that [the Chemical Weapons Convention 
Implementation Act of 1998] covers what Bond did; and we have no authority to amend 
it. So we are forced to decide—there is no way around it—whether the Act’s application 
to what Bond did was constitutional”). Chief Justice Roberts has also joined opinions that 
reflect disagreement with the Court’s textualists. In Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1075 
(2015), Chief Justice Roberts joined the majority to hold that a fish is not a “tangible 
object” for purposes of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act; Justice Alito concurred only in the 
judgment, and Justices Scalia and Thomas joined Justice Kagan’s dissent. In American 
Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014), Chief Justice Roberts joined the 
majority’s interpretation of the word “perform” in the Copyright Act; Justices Scalia, 
Thomas, and Alito dissented. See id. at 2515. 
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observes that it accomplishes a similar result by considering “non-
textual factors when determining how much clarity is required for 
a text to be clear.”64 This methodology, when combined with 
Chief Justice Roberts’ devotion to constitutional avoidance,65 has 
yielded cases like NFIB v. Sebelius. 
To the extent that NFIB v. Sebelius expresses a commitment 
to judicial restraint by creatively interpreting ostensibly clear 
statutory text, its approach is at odds with the statutory textualism 
to which most originalists subscribe. Thus Justice Scalia, 
criticizing the majority’s construction of the Affordable Care Act 
in both NFIB v. Sebelius and King v. Burwell, protested that the 
statute known as Obamacare should be renamed “SCOTUScare” 
in honor of the Court’s willingness to “rewrite” the statute in 
order to keep it afloat.66 For Justice Scalia and those who share 
his commitment to uphold text, the measure of a court is its fair-
minded application of the rule of law, which means going where 
the law leads. By this measure, it is illegitimate for the Court to 
distort either the Constitution or a statute to achieve what it 
deems a preferable result. 
All of this is to say that Barnett is not alone in his skepticism 
of either the Roberts Court’s conception of judicial restraint or its 
approach to statutory interpretation. Indeed, this is a point on 
which those who treat the original public meaning of text as a 
constraint might agree, regardless whether they embrace 
Barnett’s Republican Constitution. 
 
 
 64. Richard M. Re, The New Holy Trinity, 18 GREEN BAG 2D 407, 408 (2015). 
 65. See Neal Kumar Katyal & Thomas P. Schmidt, Active Avoidance: The Modern 
Supreme Court and Legal Change, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2109, 2112 (2015) (arguing that the 
Roberts Court has applied the avoidance canon so aggressively that it is willing to rewrite 
statutes to avoid addressing constitutional questions). 
 66. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2507 (Scalia, J., dissenting). King, of course, is a case about 
statutory rather than constitutional interpretation, but insofar as the Court strained the 
language to avoid a holding that would have gutted the statute, the opinion reflects the 
same impulse animating NFIB v. Sebelius. 
